Exploiting Generational Garbage Collection: Using Data Remnants to Improve Memory Analysis and Digital Forensics by Pridgen, Adam T
RTCE IINWERSITY
Exploiting Generational Garbage Collection: Using Data
Remnants to Improve Memory Analysis and Digital Forensics
by
Adam T. Pridgen
A Tunsrs Sunurrrpn
rN PeRrrel Fulr'rr-LMENT oF THE
RgeURBMENTS FoR THE DscRsB
Doctor of Philosophy
Professor of Electrical and Computer
Engineering and Computer Science
AprRovBn, THEsts Colrrumrrg :
Keith D. Cooper
L. John & Ann H. Doerr Chair in Computational
Engineering, Professor, Computer Science
Assistant Professor of Department of
Information and Logistics Technology
Houston, Texas
January,2017
Chris Bronk
ABSTRACT
Exploiting Generational Garbage Collection: Using Data Remnants to Improve Memory Analysis
and Digital Forensics
by
Adam T. Pridgen
Malware authors employ sophisticated tools and infrastructure to undermine information security
and steal data on a daily basis. When these attacks or infrastructure are discovered, digital forensics
attempts to reconstruct the events from evidence left over on file systems, network drives, and
system memory dumps. In the last several years, malware authors have been observed used the
Java managed runtimes to commit criminal theft and conduct espionage.
Fortunately for forensic analysts, the most prevalent versions of Java uses generational garbage
collection to help improve runtime performance. The memory system allocates memory from
a managed heap. When memory is exhausted in this heap, the JVM will sweep over partitions
reclaiming memory from dead objects. This memory is not sanitized or zero’ed. Hence, latent
secrets and object data persist until it is overwritten. For example, sockets and open file recovery
are possible even after resources are closed and purged from the OS kernel memory.
This research measures the lifetime of latent data and implements a Python framework that can be
used to recover this object data. Latent secret lifetimes are experimentally measured using TLS
keys in a Java application. An application is configured to be very active and minimally active.
The application also utilizes raw Java sockets and Apache HTTPClient to determine whether or
not a Java framework impacts latent secret lifetimes. Depending on the heap size (512MiB to
16GiB), between 10-40% of the TLS keys are recoverable from the heap, which correlates directly
to memory pressure.
This research also exploits properties to identify and recover evidence from the Java heap. The
RecOOP framework helps locate all the loaded types, identify the managed Java heaps, and scan for
potential objects. The framework then lifts these objects into Python where they can be analyzed
further. One key findings include the fact that IO streams for processes started from within Java
remained in memory, and the data in these buffers could be used to infer the program executed.
Socket and data could also be recovered even when the socket structures were missing from the
OS’s kernel memory.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Digital forensics focuses on recovering artifacts and evidence for the purposes of reconstructing
events. The information gathered comes from several places like; network traffic, appliances,
applications logs, disk drives, memory, etc. However, forensic collection of evidence runs into
challenges because the desired information is recovered after the the incident has occured.
Due to the diverse nature of information technology, effective forensics requires a copious amount
of technology and software to perform analysis and interpret the results. Figure 1.1 shows an
overview of tasks, activities, and high-level questions that help drive the digital forensics process.
For example, if a disk drive is forensically analyzed, special hardware is required to mount devices
read-only, and then software is used to read the disk at a low-level and account for each logical
block and reconstruct the file system. This reconstruction must also account for discovered blocks
not specified as in use because they may have been used to store illicit material. Fortunately, file
systems rarely change, and their evolution is accompanied with the tools required for analysis.
Memory analysis is another area of digital forensics that relies on software and thorough analy-
sis. Memory analysis focuses on recovering evidence from the physical memory and swap files.
Software used to recover artifacts from system memory must consider the hardware architecture,
operating system, memory management (namely paging), and data structure interpretation.
At large, memory analysis frameworks like Volatility and Rekall improve the ease of analyzing
most physical memory dumps. Over time, these frameworks have been updated to handle common
operating systems, hardware architectures, and interpretation of data structures. They also handle
2Figure 1.1 : An overview of activities and tasks that cover digital forensics.
memory images from several different formats like VMWare memory files, raw system memory,
etc.
These frameworks and current memory analysis research tend to fall short when looking at ap-
plications or software systems that extend beyond the operating system. Specifically, if memory
analysis is required for a specific application or process, an analyst is required to develop their own
methodology and plugins on top of these frameworks.
In an enterprise environment or a law enforcement setting, this knowledge gap is daunting. As
a substitution for deeper understanding, the forensic analysts use tools that look for structurally
recognizable artifacts like strings, sockets, etc. This approach is used because trying to understand
program data structures requires time and sometimes deep low-level understanding about how
the underlying operating system and hardware work. Often, front line analysts do not have the
luxury to develop the expertise and tooling to meet the demand for this specific and detailed set of
knowledge.
The Stuxnet cyberattack demonstrated that almost any type equipment and software, no matter how
isolated, can be used to conduct sophisticated attacks [1]. Hence, responding to sophisticated at-
3Figure 1.2 : A few attack tactics and techniques commonly employed by threat actors to gain
access to victims and collateral systems.
tacks requires foresight and planning. After these revelations from Stuxnet, we surveyed common
technologies in information technology to find areas that an attacker may target or use to conceal
their activities. The Java virtual machine (JVM), runtime, and frameworks provide a wide spread
deployment platform. Java is used in a wide array of systems ranging from Blu-Ray players to web
services and applications.
In fact, threat actors have used Java for several attacks (Figure 1.2), and vulnerabilities in Java have
been used to conduct these attacks and campaigns. Java malware and remote access tools (RAT)
are not typically recognized as a globally prevalent threat, but implants written for the JVM still
present a danger to most enterprise networks. First, this type of malware runs on almost any OS or
architecture. The only requirement is compatibility between class or Java archive (JAR) files and
the JVM executing the program.
Second, Java programs are typically beyond the purview of most intrusion prevention and anti-
virus systems. These systems do not typically attempt to parse or understand the program. Instead
they rely on hashes, regular expressions, or program behavior to identify the program and its intent.
4Software virtual machines (VMs) are probably one of the most monumental inventions in informa-
tion technology. The VMs on these software platforms make it possible to develop, test, and deploy
code across many different hardware architectures and operating systems. The VMs abstract the
native runtime away from the developer, and the VM runtime provides a rich environment for soft-
ware applications. Hence, these systems have gained wide spread adoption and become the staple
of modern enterprise networks. Attackers have taken note of the homogeneity of these and actively
target software VMs and their respective Runtime environments. Attackers exploit the VM and the
platform to gain access to the host operating system, and attackers develop malware to maintain
access, which facilitates lateral movement since the runtimes on each of the machines are similar.
There are several notable campaigns against organizations using Java. Galerpin et al. detail how
the Kazakh government used malicious documents to infect political dissidents and journalists [2].
In this case, the government reportedly hired a third-party security firm to spear phish individuals
who were suing the Kazakh government. The attackers used a malicious PDF that installed either
a Java backdoor (Jacksbot or JRat) or a Windows specific piece of malware (Bandook). JRat is
a commercially available piece of malware with many open source modules that can be used for
infecting and maintaining access on target machines.
Another campaign dubbed IceFog or JavaFog by Kaspersky labs targeted military industries, po-
litical figures, and governments [3, 4]. During the latter part of 2013, unknown threat actors tar-
geted various organizations using Windows portable executable (PE) malware. When Kaspersky
published reports detailing the IceFog campaigns, the actors shut down their infrastructure. How-
ever, a short period later, the threat actors started using a Java variant of the backdoor on US targets.
At the time, the variant went undetected by several anti-virus vendors.
Scott-Railton et al. have also observed South American threat actors using Java as their primary
RAT [5]. These attackers used a combination of social engineering with spear phishing, fake
news sites, and malware to conduct their operations. The campaigns from these attacks were first
5observed in 2015, but the activity was observed as far back as 2014. The threat actors would entice
their targets into opening malicious files with convincing emails, pop-ups on malicious news sites,
or using third-party cloud drives to host the malware linked from malicious sites. Between 2008-
2013, the group used PE executables for remote access, but in 2014 this group moved to Java based
malware, namely AlienSpy and Adzok.
The AlienSpy malware is a commercial product that has roots in an open source version from
2013. Adwind is also a variant of the same project. The criminals using Adwind have infected
over 400,000 systems [6].
There are several ways to analyze the malware in live environments. Typically, this analysis re-
quires the JAR file, an development environment like Eclipse, and in some cases, decompiled
source code. The malware analyst requires the original files to make this work. For example, if the
RAT downloads and deletes itself from disk, then the file may not be recoverable which prevents
direct analysis. Additionally, if the malware downloads and loads modules that are on a remote
system, then these analysis techniques will fail.
1.1 Supporting Work
This work builds on two of our previous projects: STAAF [7] and our Radare Java extensions [8].
STAAF is an engineering project that focused on scaling Android application analysis. In the
early days of Android, off-market stores appeared online, which side-stepped some of the security
protections offered in official stores supported by Google.
These off-market stores were not policed to identify potential malware or copyright infringement.
As an experiment, we focused our efforts on building a scalable analyis platform. The goals of
this platform were to enable collaboration among analysts, enable pluggable modules, and localize
data so that modules and analysis pipelines worked efficiently. Insights learned on this project
6were applied to our infrastructure for measuring latent secrets, namely orchestration, pipelining of
analysis, and developing a scalable analysis system as system memories increased beyond 4GiB.
Another supporting work were our extensions to Radare. Prior to our extensions analysis of Java
malware was limited to only a few tools. None of these tools permitted low-level analysis or
manipulation of Java class or archive files. For instance tools like CFR and JD-GUI help with
decompiling the malware. The decompiled classes are then modified and recompiled using an
environment like Eclipse IDE. After recompilation, the malware can be run, monitored, and ma-
nipulated using Eclipse’s integrated debuger functions. However, problems arise when the Java
program cannot be decompiled.
In these cases, there were no alternatives. Our extensions helped eliminate these limitations in
the following ways. First, the extensions permit the manipulation of access flags for Java classes,
fields, and methods. When changed, the elements can now be accessed directly. Hence, an analyst
can write a Java program or use Jython to run execute parts of the Java malware and inspect values
after the computation. Furthermore, these flags can be inspected to determine whether or not they
are causing faulty analysis in the decompilers or the IDE. In one example, we found that JD-GUI
ignored methods with access flags marked as native. The native access flag indicates that the
method is compiler generated, so our belief is JD-GUI simply ignores these functions, meaning
attacker code could hide in plain sight.
Second, our extensions took advantage of Java symbolic references to enable hooking. Our exten-
sions enabled us to pin-point and hook specific classes and methods. Specifically, we could read
the class file, replace references to function names, and then load our own code that intercepted
any calls or accesses to a target class. Renaming functions and classes in the classfile is especially
challenging, because this requires resizing the entire class file.
Finally, the extensions allow an analyst to modify or directly write bytecode into methods. This
injected bytecode can then be used to redirect control. Modifying instructions in the methods can
7also be used to eliminate obfuscated code that is used to confuse decompilers.
1.2 Contributions
This work extends the boundaries of technical knowledge of Java forensics, malware analysis, and
memory analysis in several ways. We focus exclusively on the Java runtime. Our research revealed
that very little attention has been paid to the HotSpot JVM and its runtime with respect to digital
forensics. We found this surprising given the maturity of the project. We demonstrate how much
information can be gathered from the HotSpot JVM. Specifically, we show that object data is not
sanitized or overwritten, meaning attackers or forensic specialists can easily recover latent secrets
and other artifacts. Finally, the work demonstrates Java object recovery from a HotSpot JVM in
a system memory image. Furthermore, this research generalizes how similarly managed runtimes
can be analyzed for forensics purposes.
8Chapter 2
HotSpot Memory Background
The HotSpot JVM implements several different garbage collectors, but all use generational copy-
ing to improve memory management performance.
In generational copying, new objects are created in the Eden space. The Eden space is further
partitioned into thread local allocation buffers (TLAB), allowing for low-cost memory allocation
with minimal locking in multi-threaded applications. The generational hypothesis states that most
objects die young; indeed, most Java objects die quickly[9], but some age and survive GC, and
are migrated from Eden to the survivor spaces, which together with the Eden Space are called
the young generation. Objects are eventually copied from the young generation to the tenured
generation. A typical Java heap memory layout contains many such sections (Figure 2.1a).
Because of its focus on performance, the JVM does not clear the contents of memory when an
object is moved from one space to another [10]. Stale data will eventually be overwritten as
memory is reused, but these overwrites may also never happen.
In newer HotSpot JVM’s, an alternative Garbage First Garbage Collector (G1GC) uses a parti-
tioned heap space (Figure 2.1b), allowing parallel garbage collection during incremental collec-
tion. During an incremental collection, G1GC identifies regions with the most garbage and copies
the objects into a new region, allowing it to reclaim those regions [11].
Java runtime performance typically improves when the JVM is given additional RAM, as less
memory pressure results in more flexibility for the garbage collector. This decreased pressure also
results in latent secrets remaining longer in RAM, improving the chances of recovering sensitive
9(a) Typical SerialGC Generational Heap
(b) Typical G1GC Generational Heap
(c) OOP layout for a String[2] referencing
String[0].
Figure 2.1 : Heap and OOP memory layouts used by the HotSpot JVM.
information—a boon for forensic analysis.
Furthermore, the HotSpot JVM uses a region-based memory allocator to manage the sharing of
large blocks of memory between the garbage collector and native C libraries. This creates the
additional possibility that a garbage collector, finished with a region, might release it to the region
allocator, which could then reuse the memory without first zeroing it.
Java objects are variably sized. The invariant part of the object structure includes a mark header,
object metadata, and class information. The variable portion contains object’s non-static fields.
Raw pointers otherwise known as original object pointers (OOPs) refer to the address of the Java
object in process memory, which lies in the heap.
The mark header usually starts the structure and includes the hash identifier of the object, thread
ownership information, and metadata (e.g. age and liveness) used by the GC. This mark header
is typically followed by a pointer to a type definition (which HotSpot calls a Klass). The type
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pointer defines each offset necessary to access fields of the object in the heap. If the object fields
are primitive values, then these values are written directly into that memory location. If the field is
a reference, then the field value is an OOP pointing to the object.
Array objects have a slightly different structure. In addition to the mark header and type informa-
tion, the object also contains metadata defining dimensionality and the number of elements in the
array. The size of an array object also depends on the type (e.g. Byte[] vs. char[] vs. int[]).
The Byte[] is an array of OOPs, while the char[] and int[] are arrays of 2- and 4-byte values,
respectively.
Figure 2.1c depicts the heap memory layout of a String[2], which is actually an array of two
Object references, each pointing to a String. The first element contains a reference to a value of
type char[5]. The values for the char[] are inlined. Needless to say, these basic object header
structures are kept very simple, because they will be widely repeated in memory.
Chow et al.defined data lifetimes from its inception to deallocation [12, 13]. These concepts are
illustrated in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.2a how we expect a program dealing with sensitive data to
behave. When the allocation takes place, the data structure is initialized in-place, and the program
will perform some activity using this data. Once the data is no longer needed, the program zero’s
or corrupts the data and deallocates this structure. Note, the structure is not moved around once it
was initialized.
This type of behavior cannot be expected in a managed memory context, especially one employing
garbage collection. Figure 2.2b shows a very different story. After an object is allocated, collection
can happen, and the object is copied from its original address to a new address. This creates a
potential latent secret. The programmer no longer has control over the old copy. Once the data
is out of scope, another latent secret is created if the developer does not corrupt the object data
beforehand.
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(a) Explicit data lifetime of unmanaged data.
(b) Data lifetime of GC-managed data.
Figure 2.2 : Data lifetimes in unmanged and managed vary significantly.
In runtimes using generational garbage collection, this problem is exacerbated. First, multiple
copies of object will be created. These copies will only be overwritten after garbage collection
happens and when the memory is reallocated to a new object. This data overwrite may not happen
in a timely manner, because collection must happen before the memory can be reused. Even if
collection happens, the memory may never be overwritten because the program is not very active.
Chapters 3 and 4 will discuss this issue and its consequences in greater detail.
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Chapter 3
Measuring and reducing latent secrets in HotSpot JVM
3.1 Introduction
Managed memory runtime environments like Java eliminate many kinds of programming errors
that can become security vulnerabilities. For example, Java programs are not vulnerable to buffer
overflow attacks, making Java (and other “safe” languages) attractive for building security-critical
software. Meanwhile, techniques such as just-in-time compilation, hot-spot optimization, and
parallel garbage collection, have largely eliminated the performance penalty of using managed
runtime environments. These features and a rich set of standard libraries have led to a broad
adoption of Java and other such languages.
However, the HotSpot JVM introduces risk when dealing with sensitive data [14]. Our research
shows that the HotSpot JVM allows session identifiers, passwords, and TLS 1.2 session keys to
remain in the JVM process memory after the corresponding Java objects have been garbage col-
lected. Furthermore, because Java provides no direct access to the underlying memory, developers
cannot explicitly sanitize their sensitive data once it is no longer needed. An attacker, on the other
hand, might still be able to gain access to the raw memory through many means, such as a hyper-
visor bypass attack, access to a swap or hibernation file, or from another process running on the
same physical machine. Of course, we hope that traditional system security mechanisms can keep
an attacker away from this data, but for the cases in which an attacker can gain access to the JVM’s
process memory, limiting the time that sensitive data remains in memory provides defense-in-depth
security coverage.
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Automated memory management falls into two categories: reference counting, which is used in
Python and Swift, and tracing garbage collection, which is used by Java and many other language
systems. Tracing garbage collection measures reachability from a set of root objects to every object
in memory. Objects that can no longer be reached are considered garbage. Garbage collectors are
typically lazy; there is a gap between when an object becomes unreachable and when the garbage
collector reuses that memory. GC can also re-arrange the managed heap to help improve collector
performance and reduce pause times. This rearrangement inherently involves copying objects,
which can leave behind multiple “old” copies.
In this paper we demonstrate confidentiality failures due to a semantic gap between the language
that programmers use, the language implementation, and the underlying execution environment,
echoing similar findings in other areas (e.g. [12, 15]). Specifically, we establish the volume of
secrets that an unsanitized heap can expose, using a TLS web client atop Oracle’s HotSpot JVM,
driven by a synthetic load under different levels of memory contention. We capture whole system
memory images and then use binary string searches to find TLS keys and other sensitive data. We
then make changes to the TLS code and the garbage collector in attempt to eliminate most of these
secrets. We find that zeroization adds a significant workload to the JVM; Section 3.5 provides
future direction on how to design JVM systems that do not sacrifice performance for improved
confidentiality.
3.2 Prior Work
In 2001 Viega identified that memory is not securly deallocated in C, C++, Java, and Python run-
times [14]. Chow et al. showed that Unix operating systems and standard libraries failed to sanitize
deallocated memory; attackers could exploit this issue to recover latent secrets from common ap-
plications like Apache and OpenSSH. The authors implemented proper sanitization in the Unix
operating systems with roughly a 1% impact on performance [12, 13]. However, Chow et al.’s
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techniques cannot address the latent secrets found in the HotSpot, because the JVM uses it’s own
memory management primitives. Additional work has been done to help reduce latent secrets due
to shared program variables with static analysis [16]; Anikeev et al. [17] proposed introducing
keywords into managed languages hinting at how to securely manage object instances.
Anikeev et al. [18] study the problem of latent secrets in an Android runtime that uses the Dalvik
VM (DVM) and attempt to solve this problem by altering the GC implementation. Their work
mentions negative performance impacts due to sanitization, but they do not demonstrate how well
latent secrets are eliminated from the DVM heap. We investigate similar questions with two dif-
ferent GC implementations and measure both the performance impact and the effectiveness of
eliminating latent secrets.
CleanOS [19] is the most effective solution for eliminating the clear-text presence of latent secrets
in a VM runtime (the DVM). The researchers extended the Android SDK to allow programmers to
explicitly tag some objects as sensitive data objects (SDOs) and developed a new GC, the evict-idle
GC (eiGC), that properly sanitizes SDOs. Beyond programmer tagging, SDOs can be implicitly
tagged as the result of taint analysis. CleanOS uses TaintDroid [20] to help identify sensitive data
that are sourced from SDOs (e.g. data from TLS sockets). The eiGC protects these objects by
encrypting idle object data with an escrowed cloud application key. When the object is idle long
enough, this key is securely deallocated. If the object is still in use by the application, the eiGC
can fetch the key from the cloud application and decrypt the data. This approach relies on a third
party or an additional application server to manage keys in a secure manner, which is not ideal in
certain situations.
The process of extracting latent secrets from dump files or system memory seems challenging, but
many researchers have found the task to be quite surmountable. For example, Harrison and Xu
identified RSA cryptosystem parameters in unallocated memory that had been inadvertently writ-
ten to untrusted external storage as the result of a Linux kernel bug [21]. Halderman et al. showed
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that AES encryption keys can be readily detected in RAM from their key schedule [22]. Case pre-
sented an approach for analyzing the contents of the Dalvik virtual machine [23]. Similar attacks
are possible against Android smartphones, allowing for the recovery of disk encryption keys [24]
and Dalvik VM memory structures [25]. Jin et al. used symbolic execution and intra-procedural
analysis to accurately extract the composition of type data generated by C++ programs [26].
Finally, there are a variety of memory disclosure attacks and techniques. The most straightforward
technique uses one process to read the memory of another process utilizing a suitable device driver
or kernel module (e.g. /dev/mem or the /proc/nnn/mem devices). Because such devices are com-
monly exploited by malware, many operating systems no longer include devices for reading the
memory of other processes. However, Stu¨ttgen and Cohen developing an approach for safely load-
ing a pre-compiled kernel modules into memory on running Linux systems [27]; their approach is
now used by the Rekall Memory Forensics Framework [28].
Halderman et al. developed the “cold-boot attack” in which the DRAM memory from the target
computer is physically chilled and then transferred to a computer that is known not to wipe mem-
ory on boot [22]. It is also possible to physically read the contents of a computer’s memory using
hardware that provides direct memory access (DMA). Consumer firewire interfaces, JTAG inter-
faces, and specially constructed interface cards can perform DMA; Vo¨Mel and Freiling survey
such techniques for acquiring main memory in computers running Microsoft Windows [29]. Con-
sequently, the threat of an attacker conducting a memory disclosure attack is significant, justifying
efforts to mitigate these attacks.
We note that this class of attack may apply in a variety of different devices. Smartphones and lap-
tops may be physically stolen or otherwise captured, giving a motivated attacker physical access to
the device. Cloud services may migrate virtual machines from physical system to system, allow-
ing for a variety of attacks while the VM is migrating, or accessing the system’s memory from a
potentially compromised hypervisor.
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This article is predicated on the assumption that an attacker has somehow found a way to capture
an unencrypted system memory image; based on our survey and direct experience, we believe that
this threat is credible.
3.3 Measuring Latent Secrets
Here we discuss the infrastructure and software used to measure latent secrets in the HotSpot
JVM. For simplicity, we used black-box analysis. Our Java client application repeatedly made
TLS connections to our instrumented web server, creating an abundance of latent secrets in the
heap. On the web server, our modified OpenSSL library recorded each session’s pre-master secret
(PMS) and master secret (MKB). We then searched a memory dump of our Java client’s Linux
virtual machine for all of the previously logged secrets from every TLS session.
We ran these experiments on a small cluster of PCs running Linux KVM; the number of simultane-
ous virtual machines were limited to avoid resource contention and prevent measurement discrep-
ancies. Each experiment consisted of a pair of x64 Ubuntu 14.04 LTS VMs: our synthetic client
and a TLS webserver using a modified OpenSSL library. The web server used NGINX and TLS
1.2 to serve several static web pages. The web server VMs utilized four logical cores and 2 GiB
of RAM—enough to ensure that server performance wasn’t the bottleneck during the experiments.
The VMs that ran the Java clients were configured with 20 GiB of RAM and 4-CPUs when using
the SerialGC and 8-CPUs when using G1GC. VMs running the synthetic client were rebooted at
the conclusion of each experiment, allowing us to restart each run from a similar starting point.
3.3.1 Synthetic Client Functionality
Our synthetic Java client is a multi-threaded, configurable TLS web client. The client implements
several parameters that manipulate the memory pressure exerted on the heap, the number of con-
17
Figure 3.1 : Functional overview of our synthetic web client.
current threads, the maximum number of HTTPS requests, and the lifetime of a thread sending the
web requests. These parameters provide the ability to model basic transactions for applications
such as a thick- or web-service client.
For this paper we choose two specific configurations. Both configurations allowed up to 192
concurrent TLS connections that were active for at least 96 seconds. They differed in amount
of heap memory allowed (e.g. memory allocated from the JVM in the form of objects) and by
the number of requests allowed per thread. The high memory pressure (HMP) experiment allowed
allocations to consume up to 80% of the JVM’s managed memory, and the low memory pressure
(LMP) experiments allowed a maximum allocation of 20% from the JVM’s managed memory.
Figure 3.1 shows the two main components of the synthetic client. The Java Experiment Manager
(JEM) managed all experimental sessions (threads). The Java Experimental Sessions (JES) imple-
mented the web client functionality in a Java thread. A Python script started the experiment with
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parameters that defined the behavior of the synthetic client, the IP address of the server, and where
to store log files containing events and other data.
The JEM was responsible for managing the number of JESs and enforcing the experimental behav-
ior and garbage collection parameters. The JEM controlled the number of concurrent JESs, JES
allocation behavior, JES HTTPS requests, and the overall lifetime of the JES thread. Parameters
controlling the garbage collection defined the frequency of collection, when to start collecting, and
whether or not to pause JESs after the first GC. Our experiments also allowed us to vary the TLS
library in use (Oracle vs. BouncyCastle) and whether to use the Apache HttpClient or a TLS on
top of a basic Java socket.
We implemented and use three different TLS web clients in the JES. The most basic TLS client
was the “Socket TLS Client”. This type of client opened a TLS socket to the remote server, sent
a raw HTTP request as a formatted string, received data, and closed the socket. The second client
(“Apache TLS Client”) used the Apache “HTTPComponents” library to create an HttpClient,
which then connected to the remote host. Most of the internal HTTP mechanics were abstracted
away, simplifying the entire retrieval task; this abstraction removed sensitive data like usernames
and passwords from our control. The final client (“BoucyCastle TLS Client”) was a variant of
the Apache TLS Client that uses the BouncyCastle cryptography library instead of Oracle’s cryp-
tography library. This option allowed us to measure whether the TLS implementation, itself, can
contribute to the volume of latent secrets.
Each implementation made every effort to remove excess references and prepare the connecting
object for a future collection. In the Socket TLS Client, we close the Socket and set our refer-
ences to it to null as soon as possible. The Apache HttpClient does not have an explicit close
or shutdown API, so only references to the Apache TLS Client and BouncyCastle TLS Client be
set to null, and we hoped its internals don’t maintain references to sensitive data. We also note
that the Apache HttpClient uses an HttpClientConnectionManager to manage client connec-
19
tions. This manager may choose to maintain open connections to the remote hosts. Such socket
reuse makes reconnecting to an old peer much faster, avoiding the overhead of rebuilding a TLS
connection, but may also contribute to the build-up of key material in memory longer.
3.3.2 Memory and data analysis
Data analysis and extraction happened in three distinct phases. After an experiment, the resulting
memory, TLS session data, and web client logs containing sensitive HTTP parameters such as
the username and password are queued for analysis. First the analysis process scans the memory
dump for latent secrets (e.g. PMS and MKBs) using jbgrep. This scan is conducted using two
perspectives of the memory dump. The first perspective is the raw memory dump, which reveals
all the latent secrets along with a count for each one found. The second reconstructs the process
memory using virtual memory mapping, which details where the latent secret exists in the Java
process (e.g., which generational heap and the address in the Java process).
After the latent secrets are identified and counted, a post-processing step enumerates every HTTP
request for each JES and pairs these requests using the TLS session data and a monotonically
increasing timestamp. Although we are unable to pair the exact TLS session to the corresponding
web request, such granular knowledge is not necessary to create an approximate timeline showing
live objects versus latent garbage in the heap. All the dead PMS and MKB data are identified, and
the results are stored.
3.4 Removing Latent Secrets
Figure 3.2 combines the results of several experiments. The preliminary experiments (shown in
black) use the Oracle HotSpot JVM to examine the retention of latent secrets in the heap. These
experiments use the selected GC and run with a varied heap size between 512MiB – 16GiB. The
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(a) Socket TLS Client with HMP parameters (b) Socket TLS Client with LMP parameters
(c) Apache TLS Client with HMP parameters (d) Apache TLS Client with LMP parameters
(e) Socket TLS Client with HMP parameters
(G1GC)
(f) Apache TLS Client with HMP parameters
(G1GC)
Figure 3.2 : These plots compare the results for the Socket TLS Client the Apache TLS Client.
The lines show how many latent secrets can be removed from memory by sanitizing the heap space
after garbage collection. High- and Low-pressure applications are also shown. Figures 3.2a-3.2a
use the modified SerialGC and Figures 3.2e and 3.2f use the modified G1GC.
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Heap # of TLS Socket TLS Client Apache TLS Client
Size Sessions Recovered Keys Recovered Keys
(MiB) # % # %
512 5000 489 9% 286 5%
1024 5000 1059 21% 499 9%
2048 10000 1845 18% 929 9%
4096 10000 3177 31% 1608 16%
8192 15000 4786 31% 3008 20%
16384 30000 9058 30% 5354 17%
Table 3.1 : The average percentage of recoverable TLS sessions from HMP clients using the Seri-
alGC on the Oracle HotSpot JVM.
number of TLS session also vary to establish a reasonable baseline of retained latent secrets in
each heap size. We collected 20 samples per memory collection (Figures 3.2a – 3.2d) to help us
identify any potential variance in our measuremnts. We see the obvious outcome where the number
of recoverable TLS keys increases with heap size, doubly in some cases.
Table 3.1 shows a sample of recoverable unique keys from two control experiments. Specifically,
the table focuses on the Socket and Apache TLS Clients using HMP parameters using SerialGC.
The Apache TLS Client has fewer recoverable keys than Socket TLS Client, apparently attributable
to the larger memory footprint of each HttpClient. The Socket TLS Client requires less heap
memory per connection because it only requires IO buffers and a reference to the OS socket. This
means the Socket TLS Client client can make more connections before GC happens.
Thus, the JVM process is a viable target for memory disclosure attacks. For each TLS key recov-
ered in our control experiments, there are roughly 1-2 copies of the pre-master secret (PMS) data
and 3-4 copies of fully intact master key blocks (MKB), i.e., TLS session keys. Multiple copies
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Keys recovered after GC
Bouncy Apache Sockets
Castle TLS TLS Client TLS Client
JVM Version Client
Low Memory Pressure (LMP) Results
Oracle JVM 1542 ± 92 2972 ± 81 1084 ± 84
Modified JVM 341 ± 55 827 ± 30 304 ± 117
Modified JVM/JCE 364 ± 102 848 ± 44 371 ± 89
High Memory Pressure (HMP) Results
Oracle JVM 1671 ± 86 3052 ± 60 1202 ± 86
Modified JVM 406 ± 87 944 ± 78 371 ± 94
Modified JVM/JCE 375 ± 103 1010 ± 55 387 ± 56
Table 3.2 : The number of unique TLS keys that are recoverable after garbage collection.
of key data are the result of extraneous copies and excessive references to these copies. When our
results refer to “unique keys,” we note that an MKB can be derived from a PMS, so if we find both,
we’ll only count them as one “unique key.”
Where are these key copies coming from? Inspection of the OpenJDK Java JDK source code
reveals that local variable references are not zeroed then set to null and cloned byte[] values are
not zeroed when they are no longer needed, so the latent data stays in memory until the memory
gets reused. And, because of the generational structure of the GC, there may be additional copies
of older keys.
It is clear that latent secrets are a concern. When key material from thousands of closed connec-
tions sticks around in memory, it significantly increases the risk that encryption keys might be
compromised.
23
Consequently, we devised two approaches to address this issue, both requiring changes to the
OpenJDK source code. First, we attempted to patch the Java Cryptography Engine (JCE) and
Java Secure Sockets Extensions (JSSE). After manually auditing the code, we took steps to ensure
classes perform explicit sanitization on local variables containing secrets, and explicit calls are
added to ensure key data is overwritten when TLS sessions and sockets close. Our second approach
focused on modifying the JVM internals. Specifically, we added code to zero memory as it was
de-allocated, and to zero all unused heap spaces after each GC-cycle.
3.4.1 Adding Sanitization to the JVM
We modified the OpenJDK HotSpot JVM source code to implement a global sanitization solution
in the heap. For simplicity, we choose to modify the SerialGC and G1GC implementations—the
current and future default server garbage collectors for the HotSpot JVM. First, we focused our
efforts on cleansing the young generation in the SerialGC, and then we tackled the problem in the
tenured generation. The following approach generalizes nicely to both collectors. The emphasis of
the approach forces sanitization on the internal memory structures of the JVM and managed heap
during and after the garbage collection cycle happens.
Since generational GC partitions the heap, the algorithms and policies used to collect each gen-
eration can vary. For example, the SerialGC young generation uses copy-collection while the
tenured generation generally relies on mark-and-sweep followed by compaction. The G1GC em-
ploys similar techniques to decide how and when incremental or full collection happen. In both
cases, we tagged along with the sweep or incremental phases, zeroing out regions of the memory
corresponding to dead objects. When compaction happens, we similarly zero out the original ob-
jects, one by one, after they’re relocated. (Unfortunately, Hotspot’s SerialGC doesn’t ever do a
giant copy-compaction during collection in the tenured space with a from-space and a to-space, so
there’s never a huge block of memory we can blindly zero out.)
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Zeroing individual objects, or arrays, as the sweep phase or copy phase figures out that they’re
garbage, seemed like a relatively efficient change to make to the garage collection, since the mem-
ory in question was just recently touched, so it should already be in the CPU’s cache. Unfortu-
nately, this strategy required us to understand all of the specific tricks that the garbage collector
uses, so we know when it’s truly safe to write zeros into memory.
Notably, we encountered cases where invalid dummy objects were placed in the heap. Without
knowing this fact, we would check pointers and class types using internal APIs, and these checks
caused segmentation faults in the JVM. After some investigation, we discovered that this issue
was the result of a hack to make the heap appear to be contiguous during collection, which is a
precondition to make GC work correctly. Recall, each TLAB is a small partition of the eden space,
so the JVM fills the empty spaces with dummy objects during GC or when a TLAB is invalidated.
We resolved this issue by ensuring Klass pointers (i.e., pointers to the C++ representation of a
Java class) fall inside the Java metaspace, where all Java meta-objects (e.g. classes, methods, etc.)
reside, prior to overwriting.
We also had a variety of other minor issues. For example, dealing with primitive Java types (like
byte arrays) versus class types (like Byte arrays) required specific logic.
After modifying the garbage collector, we still found latent secrets that survived, and they were
outside of the managed heap. Recall that the JVM maintains memory blocks that are explicitly
allocated and freed. Latent secrets were getting copied there as well. We addressed the problem
by sanitizing all internal memory deallocations (similar to [12]). Leveraging the JVM’s native
memory tracking (NMT) for this task. Typically, NMT is used to track internal memory allocations
to help with profiling, diagnostics, and debugging. For our purposes, we used NMT to identify the
size of each allocation, and then we zero the buffer before the memory is returned to allocation
pool.
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3.4.2 Sanitization Effectiveness
Our second set of experiments focus on assessing our JCE/JSSE modifications, and we also ex-
plore whether Oracle’s cryptography library might be responsible for retaining additional latent
secrets. Three different Java runtime configurations use the SerialGC: Oracle HotSpot JVM, mod-
ified OpenJDK HotSpot JVM and modified OpenJDK HotSpot JVM cryptography libraries; our
three different TLS clients run in these environments. The JVM heap size is fixed at 4GiB, and
10 memory dumps are collected for each experimental configuration. To ensure that sanitization
is working properly, the JEM pauses the JES threads and performs an explicit GC to invoke the
added sanitization steps before dumping the VM’s system memory. The Socket TLS Client ex-
periment averages 11.9K TLS sessions, and the Apache TLS Client and Apache TLS Client with
BouncyCastle experiments average 16.6K and 16.8K respectively.
Table 3.2 shows the average results from this set of experiments. The modified JVMs exhibit a
significant drop in the number of latent secrets present. However, this massive reduction is mostly
attributable to the sanitization added after collecting the young generation. Since sanitization of
the heap generations depends largely on allocation failures, the tenured generation needs more
collection activity to trigger the removal of latent secrets, which we realized after analyzing the
GC logs.
We also see that the JCE and JSSE modifications modestly increased the number of latent secrets
in the heap. We’re not entirely sure why this occurred. It’s possible that our code modifications
created side-effects on the JIT compiler. For example, compiler could have optimized out our
zeroing code or perhaps the resulting code maintains unnecessary references to otherwise dead
objects. These negative findings reinforce the importance of support from not only the garbage
collector but also the underlying JVM. Pure application-level zeroing of data will never adequately
address the problem.
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Both the “BouncyCastle” configuration and the “Apache” configuration use the same Apache
HTTP client library, so the only significant difference is that the “Apache” configuration is using
the Oracle TLS library. Why is the BouncyCastle version so much better? A manual inspection of
the BouncyCastle code shows that the authors make fewer copies of key material. That said, the
“Socket TLS Client” experiment drops the Apache HTTP client library and directly drives the Or-
acle TLS libraries. This gives up the performance and concurrency features of the Apache library,
but has the fewest latent secrets. These results suggest that complex interactions between libraries
and networking layers can have unforeseen increases in the volume of latent secrets.
The third and fourth experiments recreate the conditions from the initial assessments to evalutate
the overall reduction of latent secrets. The JVM heap size varies from 512 MiB – 16 GiB, the
number of sessions vary between 5K – 30K, and the host system uses 4-CPUs (SerialGC) or 8-
CPUs (G1GC). In the third experiment, the focus is on both the HMP and LMP configurations of
the Apache and Socket TLS Client, and the fourth experiment only looks at HMP configurations.
Figures 3.2a-3.2d presents a progression towards eliminating latent secrets in the heap using the
SerialGC. In some circumstances the volume of latent secrets stays small regardless of heap size,
while in other circumstances the volume of latent secrets starts small, but with very large heaps it
grows significantly. We believe this is a consequence of the tenuring process. The GC may not
collect seemingly dead objects in the tenured generation because extraneous references to those
objects are not dead yet. Additionally, if memory pressure is inadequate then this generation may
never be collected.
Figures 3.2a and 3.2c demonstrate that this tenuring effect on objects is mitigated, and most, if not
all, of the latent secrets are eliminated. The G1GC offers improved performance and sanitization
because it uses smaller heap regions to store objects. These partitions help facilitate parallel GC,
and the smaller regions can lessen the amount of memory that needs to be zeroed during each GC,
especially in the tenured generation. After some initial experiments, we found that two explicit
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GC calls are necessary to achieve full heap sanitization; the SerialGC required four explicit calls to
fully zero the heap. The first explicit GC triggers an incremental collection, and the second forces
a full collection because it interrupts the incremental collection.
3.4.3 Benchmarking
(a) tradebeans - DayTrader Benchmarks (b) lusearch - Text Searching Benchmark
Figure 3.3 : The benchmarks show that our modifications have significant effects on the GC per-
formance. The unmodified OpenJDK (black) benchmarks are the baseline.
Overall, the findings from each of the experiments demonstrate the difficulty of eliminating sen-
sitive data in a managed runtime. Now, we want to determine how our modifications affect the
JVM’s performance. We use the Dacapo benchmark suite, version 9.12 [30] to measure these
impacts. This benchmark framework uses several real world applications to measure runtime per-
formance, but we only show two for brevity: lusearch and tradebeans. The lusearch bench-
mark performs a number of searches over a textual corpus using lucene, a text searching engine.
The tradebeans benchmark is a DayTrader application that interacts with an Apache Geronimo
backend and h2.
Each benchmark executes 50 times with the default workload parameter, pre-iteration GC disabled
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and four workload threads. The benchmarks run on an unmodified OpenJDK HotSpot JVM and
the modified JVM with variable heap sizes (e.g. 1 GiB–16 GiB) and CPUS (either 4 or 8). The
unmodified JVM is built on the same machine using the same build settings of our modified JVM;
we take this precaution to eliminate any build or code optimization variables that might influence
the benchmark results, which cannot otherwise be done with Oracle’s HotSpot JVM.
Figure 3.3 shows the benchmark results, which are not surprisrising. The G1GC with 8-CPUs
incurred performance penalties from sanitization: 200% in lusearch and 21% in tradebeans.
We discuss how future GC implementations can address the performance issue in §3.5.
3.5 Discussion and Future Work
Cleansing latent secrets from managed memory is a challenging problem, and application or run-
time demands are going to dictate how these challenges are addressed. We have seen that parallel
collectors like the G1GC offer some relief for these issues, but redesigning the JVM to provide for
proper sanitization seems to be a better alternative in terms of performance. CleanOS exemplifies
how these modifications to both the managed heap and the software VM imprpove security [19].
This extension to Android encrypts sensitive data objects in place, and then when the object is no
longer needed or it’s idle, the key is securely deallocated. However, when considering server-side
changes, re-engineering the JVM should also consider dealing with sensitive native IO operations,
shared variables in applications [16], and incorporating explicit data lifetimes into the program-
ming language [13, 17].
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Figure 3.4 : A generational heap layout concept that uses a monitored space where sensitive data
is stored and maintained.
A feasible strategy explicitly segregates sensitive data into its own monitored space that identifies
and removes latent secrets promptly. Developers need the ability to define data lifetimes when
writing their code. Java currently has meta-data tags, known as annotations, that help with the
compile-, build-, and runtime operations. Data lifetime annotations could help the JVM handle,
store, and sanitize these data items without impacting other code.
Figure 3.4 shows a hypothetical heap with an additional monitored space. In the monitored space,
memory might be explicitly reference counted, allowing for immediate sanitization when an object
dies. Furthermore, these objects could have explicit “destroy” APIs, so applications can explicitly
kill them or an executive task can reclaim the object. Functionally, references from the main heap
to the monitored space would act like weak references, making it clear to the application author
that sensitive, monitored data could disappear at any time, and must be checked explicitly before
each use. Such a strategy sounds straightforward, but it would have a variety of problems. For
example, sensitive data can touch multiple layers of the protocol stack. Zero-copy IO techniques
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(e.g., IO-Lite [31]) could help with this, but require the entire stack to be engineered around a
particular buffer management strategy. Changes like this would break existing APIs and require
re-engineering of libraries.
3.6 Conclusion
Java and the HotSpot JVM will likely be around for decades to come. This runtime offers a rich
set of development tools and libraries that help engineers construct and deploy useful software.
However, servers and services are susceptible to a number of attacks through a variety of vectors,
so there is no guarantee that the system where the software executes will remain free from com-
promise. Attackers evolve quickly, and they will realize that the JVM does not effectively sanitize
internal or Java heap memory. This lack of sanitization can compromise sensitive data and lead
to unforeseen impacts and consequences. We have taken a proactive approach to this problem by
measuring its existence and developing several strategies to help mitigate the problem.
Problems with managed runtime environments like Java and the JVM are well known, but they are
not well understood. Our research provides several fundamental elements. We establish the heaps
capacity to retain latent secrets. Furthermore, we show that as heaps increase in size the number
of latent secrets also increases. Cryptographic libraries should protect sensitive data such as keys,
but we find that Oracle’s JCE implementation of TLS 1.2 does not attempt to eliminate key data.
Given the lack of sanitization in the Java heap, we demonstrate several approaches that reduce
the accumulation of sensitive data. Used together, the number of TLS keys are reduced dramati-
cally. To accomplish this feat, we first modify the JVM to zero unused heap space in the young
generation. Second, the tenured generation is also wiped when the dead objects or live objects
are encountered during the mark-sweep-compact collection algorithm. We also zero unused heap
space after the garbage collection, showed these approaches work for both the SerialGC and the
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G1GC.
We define how to improve performance of garbage collection implementations while keeping data
security in mind. Our proposed design modifies the overall structure of the heap, carving out a
segment specifically for sensitive data. The design also exploits Java annotations, which can be
used to inform the runtime about how to properly handle specific types of data. This design keeps
execution and runtime efficiency in mind while allowing for the timely and effective sanitization
of data.
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Chapter 4
ReCOOP: Framework for recovering live and dead Java
objects in HotSpot JVM
4.1 Introduction
Memory analysis can yield important information when performing forensic analysis as a part of
incident response, but it can also be extremely tedious. Several factors hinder memory forensics.
First, an analyst requires tools or some understanding about how to extract and interpret the data
structures supporting the program. Second, these data structures might be incomplete, overwritten
or missing. Finally, the amount of data extracted from memory and its creation order can be
impossible know for certain.
Standard memory analysis frameworks like Rekall and Volatility focus on recovering forensic in-
formation from OS structures and services. Conversely, when dealing with a garbage-collected
/ managed runtime memory system, the interpretation of recovered memory objects depends not
on the host machine’s architecture or operating system, but on the particularities of the managed
runtime implementation. As more applications are written in language like Java, Python, or Mi-
crosoft’s .Net languages, using garbage collection to manage their memory, threads, and other
system state, it becomes increasingly important for forensics tools to address these systems.
Furthermore, attackers are increasingly crafting exploits for code running within managed run-
times, delivering code-injection attacks against a variety of services. Forensic tools must then
connect low-level kernel state with high-level object state to present a coherent picture of the at-
tacker at work.
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This research builds on our previous work exploring JVM data retention through the observation
and measurement of latent artifacts in the heap [32]. Here we present JVM tools that we built
to rapidly analyze an obfuscated malware. Next, we demonstrate that evidence of sockets and
other important artifacts can be recovered from residual data in the Java heap, even if they are not
present in the operating system. We focus on the HotSpot Java Virtual Machines because it has
been widely adopted within the enterprise and is a vector of current attacks against a number of
industries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 focuses on related work and past
research, and Section 4.3 talks about the process of recovering Java objects and low-level object
pointers (e.g. Original Object Pointers (OOPs)) from the HotSpot JVM. Section 4.4 shows how
this can be applied to memory forensics and malware analysis. Section 4.5 expands on future needs
for this project. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Prior work
A large body of work has established usable techniques for copying memory, including [22]’s
“cold-boot attack,” direct memory access (DMA), FireWire, JTAG, and specially constructed in-
terface cards can perform DMA; [29] survey such techniques for acquiring main memory in com-
puters running Microsoft Windows.
The two most common forensic frameworks for decoding memory dumps are the Volatility Mem-
ory Forensics Framework [33] and Rekall Memory Forensics Framework [28]. These frameworks
are written in Python and implement plugins for specific functions such as listing valid processes
and open network connections. Separately, researchers have demonstrated special-purpose mem-
ory analysis tools for rendering the pieces of documents that remain in an application’s memory
[34], recovering Android GUIs from apps [35], and recovering photographic images that were
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shown in the view finder, even if they were never written to storage [36].
[14] identified that memory is not securely deallocated in not only C, C++, but also in systems
with managed runtimes, such as Java, and Python, potentially allowing sensitive information to be
recovered. [12, 13] showed that Unix operating systems and standard libraries failed to sanitize
deallocated memory; attackers could exploit this issue to recover latent secrets from common
applications like Apache and OpenSSH.
[37] shows that sensitive information from the Python runtime is easily retrievable, and Java has
similar issues. Forensic analysts can potentially recover copies of Java objects long after the active
objects have been garbage collected and overwritten. Such objects might contain sensitive data
related to service and user accounts, financial data, or network artifacts left behind by attackers.
Forensic analysts can use such objects for establishing an event timeline, looking for evidence
related to compromises, understanding the behavior of malicious software, and enumerating com-
promised data. [32] showed that the JVM fails to overwrite garbage-collected objects, potentially
allowing the recovery of TLS secrets long after the TLS connection has been terminated.
Many researchers have demonstrated techniques for recovering usable latent secrets from dump
files or system memory. For example, [21] identified RSA cryptosystem parameters in unallocated
memory that had been inadvertently written to untrusted external storage as the result of a Linux
kernel bug. [22] showed that AES encryption keys can be readily detected in RAM from their
key schedule. [23] presented an approach for analyzing the contents of the Dalvik virtual ma-
chine. Similar attacks are possible against Android smartphones, allowing for the recovery of disk
encryption keys [24] and Dalvik VM memory structures [25].
Automated recovery of memory structures is the pinacle of forensics work. This means that source
code is not longer necessary to create the data structure required to interpret program memory
blobs. Lin et al.showed that dynamic execution traces from programs could be used to recontruct
protocols and data structures [38, 39]. Jin et al.also used symbolic execution and intra-procedural
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analysis to accurately extract the composition of type data generated by C++ programs [26]. Dolan
et al.and Lin et al.show that even though a program and kernel space may be unpredictable, data
structures signatures can be very useful for finding and extracting relevant data [40, 41].
Data carving is also an important part of memory and file system analysis. Carving is an activity
whereby files and content are reconstructed using signatures and other data. Richard and Rous-
sev use file headers and footers find and extract file content in a parallel manner [42]. Beverly et
al.apply data carving to memory as a means of finding network content and relevant data struc-
tures. Hand et al.use data carving to find and extract binaries from memory, which is especially
challenging. Unlike the files found on disk, the runtime executable representation transforms and
relocates various file sections throughout memory.
This article is predicated on the assumption that an attacker or forensic examiner has somehow
found a way to capture an unencrypted system memory image; based on our survey and direct
experience, we believe that this threat is credible.
4.3 Approach
Our memory analysis approach focuses on both the virtual machine and the managed memory.
Our analysis components rely on a simple overlay system for data structure interpretation and a
simple system for accessing memory using the process’s virtual addressing scheme. Our analysis
framework, RecOOP, is written in Python and can be used with an interactive environment like
IPython [43] or as a library like Rekall.
Figure 4.1 depicts the process we use to recover objects from managed memory. Currently, our
RecOOP analysis focuses on recovering HotSpot JVM OOPs from x86 architectures. Adding sup-
port for 64-bit machines would only require minor modifications to address the OOP encoding. We
similarly expect that our work would generalize to support other managed runtime environments
36
Figure 4.1 : An overview of the steps that RecOOP takes to extract and recover managed memory
objects for forensic analysis.
such as those used by Mono, .Net, or JavaScript.
We implemented our analysis for the Linux and the Windows operating systems. We have suc-
cessfully tested RecOOP against 32-bit versions of Ubuntu, Windows XP SP3, Windows 7, and
Windows 8 with a Java heap size of 2GiB. Overlays are structural templates used to interpret raw
memory as a program data structure. Only 8 out of 150 C++ overlays require different padding to
achieve the correct memory layout on the different OSs. We believe these differences are due to
compilers, which tend to vary field padding in the structures.
4.3.1 Process Reconstruction
RecOOP analysis begins with process reconstruction. If the process’s memory has not already been
extracted from a RAM image, RecOOP will dump it using the Volatility Framework. Volatility will
identify the target process by name or PID and enumerate all the physical memory page frames,
which are then ordered according to the process’s virtual address space. Finally, the memory is
saved to file for future analysis or for use with other tools such as Radare [44].
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4.3.2 Extract Loaded Classes
Program portability in managed runtimes is accomplished through several key systems that resolve,
link, and sometimes compile the program being loaded and executed. Internally, there is a loader
and type system used to find and load specific classes or types, and then store these types for future
reference. The loader will look inside the application or loading path to find the correct library.
When the required types, classes, and code are loaded into the virtual memory, symbols for each
of these artifacts are created. Once completed, the runtime then links together the code for each of
the classes for the given types. Linking ensures that all class dependencies for inter-class method
calls and field access are loaded. Linking also optimizes method calls in classes that implement an
interface. For example, if class Foo implements Boingo, the links to the Boingo methods
need to be created to reduce any performance penalties when Foo is treated as a Boingo. After
linking and loading, the original class file defining the Java types and code are transformed into
machine optimized structures. These transformations are with their symbolic references in a central
location.
The HotSpot JVM stores requisite information in three different hash tables: a SystemDictionary,
a SymbolTable, and a StringTable. The SystemDictionary contains all the loaded type infor-
mation (e.g. Java classes). The SymbolTable contains all the loaded symbols for classes, methods,
fields, and enumerable types. Finally, the StringTable contains all the constant strings or strings
that exist for long periods of time. Generally, only the types required for linking are resolved
and loaded into the runtime; this proves useful when with dealing obfuscated JAR files, because
forensic or malware analysis need only focus on the loaded class files and types.
Our JVM analysis engine first looks for the symbol table and then the system dictionary. The
symbol table is a good place to begin, both because it’s structurally simple and because those
strings will be helpful to us later.
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Memory Data Structure Interpretation of the
Address Values SystemDictionary:: dictionary
0x00e5b928 0x00004e2b [struct field: int table size]
0x00e5b92c 0x00e5cd50 [struct field: SymbolTableBucket* buckets]
0x00e5b930 0x00000000 [struct field: SymbolTableEntry* free list]
0x00e5b934 0x14283408 [struct field: char* first free entry]
0x00e5b938 0x14283be0 [struct field: char* end block]
0x00e5b93c 0x0000000c [struct field: int entry size]
0x00e5b940 0x00002f4d [struct field: int number of entries]
Table 4.1 : The memory layout of a JVM SystemDictionary captured from an embedded Win-
dows 7 OS instance.
These data structures are located by scanning for invariant values (0x00004e2b or 0x000003f1)
in the C++ table size field of the structure. When these values are found, entry size and
number of entries are used for an initial sanity check. The entry size is the size in bytes for
each value entry (e.g. 1 entry = 0x000C bytes). We place an upper bound on number of entries
that starts at 100K entries but can be adjusted if necessary. Table 4.1 shows the memory layout of
a system dictionary that we want to apply these constraints to.
When these constraints are met, the engine attempts to parse a subset of the hash table entries. The
system dictionary has a pointer to these entries (e.g. HashTableBuckets* buckets): the internal
array that forms the spine of the hashtable. The engine iterates over this array and tries to follow
the bucket entries to the target value using a memory overlay. If the entries can be interpreted as
the expected values, we accept it as valid. For example, the C++ type Symbol is a vtable, followed
by some metadata, size, and the symbol string. As a heuristic, if the length of this string exceeds a
manually-chosen threshhold, the entry is considered invalid.
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Memory Data Structure Interpretation
Offset Address Values Value Information SystemDictionary:: dictionary entry values
0x00 0x142d61b4 0x0b32967d [struct field: int hash]
0x142d61b8 0x00000000 [struct field: DictionaryEntry* next]
0x142d61bc 0x13fdc908 Klass*: java/nio/channels/ByteChannel [struct field: Klass* literal]
0x142d61c0 0x00000000
0x142d61c4 0x00e5cd18 [→ oop class loader]
0x14 0x142d61c8 0x257f6796 [struct field: int hash]
0x142d61cc 0x00000000 [struct field: DictionaryEntry* next]
0x142d61d0 0x13fdccb8 Klass*: java/nio/channels/SeekableByteChannel [struct field: Klass* literal]
0x142d61d4 0x00000000
0x142d61d8 0x00e5cd18 [→ oop class loader]
0x142d61dc 0x55f713ed [struct field: int hash]
0x28 0x142d61e0 0x00f357f8 [struct field: DictionaryEntry* next]
0x142d61e4 0x13fdcf58 Klass*: java/nio/channels/GatheringByteChannel [struct field: Klass* literal]
0x142d61e8 0x00000000
0x142d61ec 0x00e5cd18 [→ oop class loader]
Table 4.2 : A memory dump showing the offsets and values embedded Windows 7 OS instance.
Table 4.2 shows some entries from a valid dictionary found by the JVM analysis engine. Most
Klass structures should have symbol names appearing in the symbol table, so when we parse
candidate dictionaries, the dictionary entries (e.g. Klass *) names are checked to see if they are
known symbols. If a majority of these symbols are found, we accept the candidate. The product of
this analysis yields the low-level memory layout of each Java class, methods, and other meta-data
like the Java constant pool. (Note: since the JVM supports class unloading, unloaded Klass names
may not be present in the SymbolTable, even when dead objects of those types are still in heap
pages waiting to be reused.) This extraction technique is OS agnostic and easily automated.
Alternative approach: the JVM tool interface Prior to developing these techniques, we at-
tempted to use symbol structures intended for the JVM tool interface (JVMTI). These structures
were found using string pointers to the symbol names, the structure size, static values in the fields,
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and the location relative to the JVM library’s base offset. When the JVM is started, these structures
are filled with the appropriate runtime data structures (e.g. SystemDictionary, SymbolTable).
We also used an optimization technique to find the best fit memory locations based on the locations
of other recovered structures, the order of the structures, and invariant values that should be present
in the structure.
Unfortunately, this approach has many obstacles. First, it was overly complex; the identification
of strings and reverse-mapping them to pointers was time intensive, and the specific strings and
structures were not always present in memory. Second, every version of Java requires a new
set of constraints because the location of the JVMTI symbols and data structures change. Thus,
this approach could not generalize across multiple platforms and JVM versions. Finally, since
these structures and JVMTI symbols were not in use, the OS paged the sections of the process’s
virtual memory out to make space for other relevant data. Most memory analysis protocols do
not consider the OS swap or page files; thus, if RAM was dumped near the start time of the JVM
process, recovery of the dictionary, symbol table, and string table addresses were likely, but after a
few minutes the chance of success dissipated.
4.3.3 Identifying Managed Memory
Knowing the location of managed memory helps with object enumeration and with sanity checking
whether or not the results are valid. However, automatically and correctly identifying these seg-
ments is difficult. We err on the side of caution and enumerate all possible locations. To prevent
erroneous object identification, we perform type checking on every object’s non-primitive field
references.
Potential managed memory areas are found by looking for an abundance of type-pointers (e.g. Klass*).
Every object is required to have a defined type. Consequently, areas with a large number of type-
pointers are likely to contain objects. The exceptions to this rule are places where class metadata
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GC Log Message
Generational Space Start and End of the Space
eden space [...] used [0xa4800000, [...] 0xa4c50000)
from space [...] used [0xa4c50000, [...] 0xa4cd0000)
to space [...] used [0xa4cd0000, [...] 0xa4d50000)
the space [...] used [0xa9d50000, [...] 0xaa800000)
Table 4.3 : The regular expression “space.*used” used in conjunction with ffastrings to de-
termine the eden, survivor, and tenure generation spaces. Note [...] signifies omitted message
content.
or compiler interface data structures are located. Most of the class metadata is known, so these
addresses are filtered out. For other areas of memory, we rely on our type checking to remove
invalid entries.
We isolate managed memory boundaries by first ignoring all memory regions less than 256KiB,
since this is less than the smallest default heap space. Second, we only consider pages with more
than 10 type-pointers, and then we smooth variations using a moving average. We only consider
areas with more then 10 type-pointers in at least 32 consecutive pages (e.g. 32×4096B= 64KiB).
This algorithm might need adjustment for G1GC, because G1GC uses humongous memory regions
(e.g. large allocations exceeding multiple MiB) for large objects.
This analysis only establishes boundaries where objects might be clustered. We avoid identifying
memory regions as a particular generational space (e.g. eden, tenured, etc.), as this could lead
to misclassifications. For example, the JVM may expand or contract a heap space depending
on application activity. Using our analysis, we might misclassify two segments of memory as
different spaces, when they were part of the same region at some point in time. A consequence of
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Adwind Obfuscated Java Malware on Linux
Loaded Classes = 1626
Type Unique Pointer Occurrences
Address Range Pointers Pointers Per Page (Y-axis: 0-64)
0xa32de000-0xa3355000 1353 265
0xa33ce000-0xa349d000 2735 331
0xa349e000-0xa34f5000 609 122
0xa3600000-0xa3692000 362 360
0xa40b0000-0xa4779000 11926 1229
0xa47ff000-0xa4c0f000 13261 266
0xa4c50000-0xa4c92000 129 28
0xa4cd0000-0xa4d50000 1121 79
0xa9d50000-0xaa000000 28810 661
0xb6936000-0xb6996000 427 413
0xc0001000-0xf7bfe000 11085 1211
Table 4.4 : Number of pointers found in address ranges with more than 10 unique “type-pointer”
occurences found on addressable word boundaries in a version of the Adwind malware. The red,
yellow, and black lines correspond to the eden, survivor, and tenure space, respectively. Table 4.3
shows how these locations are found.
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this misclassification might also lead us to miss regions where Java objects are present.
The JVM is very good about measuring performance and logging events, so if identifying genera-
tions is necessary, it still might be possible to do so without using type-pointers. If at least one GC
event has occurred, the JVM logs information about all the heap spaces internally. These log strings
contain the named heap space, start and end addresses, and other information. These messages can
be found by searching a strings dump using regular expressions like “space.*used|Metaspace.*used.”
This expression will reveal most, if not all, of the managed memory spaces used by the Java heap.
To demonstrate these procedures, we analyze data from the Adwind malware analysis case study
in the next section. Table 4.3 shows the most relevant information with an emphasis on the heap
space and memory region. The color of the heap space is also reflected in Table 4.4, which shows
the results of the type-pointer clustering. Using type-pointers narrows the number of memory re-
gions that need to be scanned from 431 to 11, and it isolates the areas where objects might exist.
The sparklines show several memory chunks that contain some of these regions, most obviously in
the 0xa47ff000-0xa4c0f000, 0xa4cd0000-0xa4d50000, and 0xa9d50000-0xaa000000 mem-
ory chunks. If we want more granular heap information, additional memory analysis is required.
4.3.4 Enumerate and Extract Objects
The location of type-pointers is used to help object enumeration and extraction. Enumeration for
objects like threads, sockets, and files happens automatically, but RecOOP permits enumerating
specific types of objects any time after the managed memory is identified. In the previous phase,
all the addresses to type-pointers were found and saved. These addresses are used to extract objects
if they fall in a managed memory boundary.
Object extraction happens in several phases. First, we check that the address adheres to the basic
object structure. Next, we use the loaded type information to determine the size of the object and
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locate its references. Then, each non-primitive field is parsed recursively, repeating these steps.
The field references are checked to see whether the value is null or the given type of the field.
Note, we also track all the potential classes a reference could be due to polymorphism. After the
fields have all been parsed and extracted, all the values in the fields are updated, and the process
completes. Values are set after all the referenced objects are enumerated to avoid an uncontrolled
recursion.
Java threads (e.g. java.lang.Thread) are enumerated and extracted first. During this process,
the native structures implementing the thread are also identified and mined for information. After
the initial identification, each thread is checked for validity and fields holding pertinent information
are analyzed, most importantly eetop, the thread’s native address. We use this field to find the
linked list containing all the threads, and we iterate over it to identify any missing threads from the
Java heap. If any are found, we repeat the object analysis for the missing thread.
Buffers and streams are investigated next because they are typically used to manage IO be-
tween the program, the JVM, and the operating system. Given the ubiquitous nature of these
objects, there are a number of base and abstract classes (e.g. java.io.InputStream) that are
used to create the different IO classes like java.io.BufferedReader. We were challenged by
the polymorphism and the number of types an object might implement. For example, determin-
ing if a SocketInputStream is used by a java.io.BufferedInputStream requires identifying
the java.io.BufferedInputStream that wraps the SocketInputStream. To deal with this is-
sue, we perform multiple scans for the different IO implementations and create a basic link ta-
ble. This link table helps cut through obscure object relationships to map IO classes with buffers
and other data. Generally, we found that the only IO classes containing buffered data were ei-
ther used by a buffered IO class or the class maintained its own buffer, as was the case with
InflaterInputStream.
Native buffers are used to marshal IO data in and out of the JVM. Classes used for the functionality
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appear to implement the DirectByteBuffer interface, which permits direct memory access. We
have only found the implementations MappedByteBuffer, NativeBuffer, and HeapByteBuffer
in the source code. Data in these buffers is captured, but it is volatile and may not be useful.
File information is collected from objects using the java.io.FileDescriptor or java.io.File
type. For the most part, the filename or path are the only useful information found in this object
type. If there is a reference from an IO object like a FileChannelImpl or FileInputStream, we
might be able to determine whether or not the file is open. If buffering is not used by the IO stream,
identifying any attributable data is difficult.
JAR files and entries contain information related to loaded files and might reveal sensitive in-
formation by way of compressed streams. JAR files typically hold all the program resources and
class files for a library or program. Class files are decompressed and loaded from JAR files as a
ZipEntry object. Usually, decompression and loading happen in lockstep, so any data related to
the process may dissipate very quickly. When raw compressed data is present in memory, a zlib
library may be able to decompress it. We have been able to successfully recover JAR filenames,
named entries, and decompressed entries. If parts of the JAR file are present in memory, we read
the low-level zip file structure, dump the resident data, and investigate the result as a zip file.
Socket objects can reveal connections well after the artifacts disappear in the OS. In particular, the
IP address along with the remote and local port are extracted, if the object is still intact. We also
attempt to associate the socket with any identified streams and data buffers.
Child process information is collected from the ProcessBuilder and OS Process implemen-
tation class. The ProcessBuilder class is the typical way to start a process. This class takes a
command string or an array of strings in addition to any object for redirecting IO. Once the process
is started, an OS-specific implementation of a Process object is created. Unfortunately, when
GC happens, the string objects used for the command string are likely to be overwritten. These
overwrites can prevent identifying the command by name.
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The Process object remains in the heap for a significant period of time. In our experiments, even
though GC happened several times, all Process objects were still recoverable. Additionally, the
IO buffers stdout, stdin, and stderr retained some data. Even though the information used
in the original instantiation of the process dissipated, we could use the process output to identify
some of the processes.
One of the benefits of a managed runtime for forensic analysis is event ordering. In the HotSpot
JVM, memory is allocated from the heap or TLABs directly after the last allocation; this sequential
allocation is a fundamental property of a wide variety of garbage collection strategies. Because the
TLABs are thread-local, then objects allocated sequentially by a thread will likely be adjacent in
memory, regardless of memory allocation activity by other threads. This ordering lends itself well
to timelining and trying to determine the relationships between events.
4.4 Evaluation
Three case studies demonstrate RecOOPs ability to extract information from a Java runtime. In
each case, only a memory image is available for analysis. Traditionally, understanding Java mal-
ware beyond sandboxing and behavioral analysis requires two things: the the JAR file and a de-
compilation tool such as CFR or JD-GUI. The analyst decompiles the JAR file, modifies the code,
recompiles, and runs the code in an IDE such as Eclipse [45, 46, 47]. Obfuscation tricks can be
very effective at blocking these efforts [48, 49, 50], and if the malware removes itself from the disk,
extraordinary efforts are required to recover the original file, which may not be feasible. In this
section, we show that Java processes contain copious amounts of information which lends itself to
static forensic analysis.
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4.4.1 Blackbox Malware Analysis and Reverse Engineering
We found an old version of the Adwind trojan on Malwr.org∗ and performed a Java centric analysis.
We ran the malware on both Linux and Windows XP SP3 VMs and found that the malware appears
to behave a little differently on Linux. Both versions of Java produce a similar thread listing
(Table 4.5). However, the program behaviors diverge because the backdoor must dump a native
library that is used by Java for snooping and keystroke logging.
Since this malware uses obfuscation, we explore the process for any latent buffers containing
compressed data. Table 4.6 shows that files can either reveal information like passwords or contain
unobfuscated class files. Listing 4.1 shows a high level prototype of a recovered class file created
by Radare. The extra/CLM.pass reveals a password field, so enumerating the object and its field
in the heap reveals the string value (vooXN3UW). Finding this value in a strings dump would be
difficult.
4.4.2 Malware Proxy
To demonstrate the effectiveness of socket analysis, we wrote a program that simulates the basic
capabilities of Java malware. In this case, an infection has been detected in the network, and
an investigation of the system reveals malware acting as a network proxy. This proxy allows an
external attacker to communicate with hosts on the internal network. Normally, the investigator
may not be able to find out what information moved in and out of the network. However, Java’s
memory model allows the socket connections and buffered data to persist indefinitely.
We ran the simulation for five minutes, sending commands instructing the agents to “do something
evil.” Table 4.8 shows the recovered socket data. Since the buffered stream and subordinate objects
were never collected or overwritten, most of the attackers commands remained intact. However,
∗Windows analysis from Malwr.org: https://malwr.com/analysis/NGUwYjM1OGI4MGE4NDZkYjg5ZGVhMGU4YTMyN2RlMDU/
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Thread Native Heap Thread
Identifier Address Address Name
1 0x00000000 0xa9e91020 main
1 0xb6907000 0xa4d3d050 main
2 0xb695f800 0xa4cd4e10 Reference Handler
2 0xb695f800 0xa9e90c58 Reference Handler
3 0xb6961000 0xa9e90ab0 Finalizer
3 0xb6961000 0xa4cd4c68 Finalizer
4 0xb697e000 0xa9e90938 Signal Dispatcher
4 0xb697e000 0xa4cd4af0 Signal Dispatcher
5 0xb697f800 0xa9e907c0 C1 CompilerThread0
5 0xb697f800 0xa4cd4978 C1 CompilerThread0
6 0xb6982c00 0xa4cd4800 Service Thread
6 0xb6982c00 0xa9e90648 Service Thread
7 0xa360ac00 0xa9e904a8 Java2D Disposer
7 0xa360ac00 0xa4cd4660 Java2D Disposer
8 0x00000000 0xa9e204f8 XToolkt-Shutdown-Thread
9 0xa361dc00 0xa4cd4318 AWT-XAWT
9 0xa361dc00 0xa9e90160 AWT-XAWT
10 0xa36f5800 0xa9e8fef8 Thread-0
10 0xa36f5800 0xa4cd15d8 Thread-0
11 0x09e24c00 0xa49f2720 Thread-1
13 0xb6907000 0xa49f9e58 DestroyJavaVM
14 0x09e35000 0xa49f5a78 pool-1-thread-1
Table 4.5 : Thread information extracted from the HotSpot JVM executing the Adwind malware
on Linux.
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Zip Inflater Size Decompressed Data
Address
0xa48f46e0 181 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa48ff850 186 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa4901720 433 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa491fcd8 170 Manifest-Version: 1.
0xa4920228 170 Manifest-Version: 1.
0xa4924c20 15 plugins. 008
0xa492c590 170 Manifest-Version: 1.
0xa492cc10 477 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa9d87160 10 vooXN3UW
0xa9e88c50 819 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa9e89600 152 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa9e89f30 607 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa9e8a9c8 117 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa9e8ad70 727 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa9e8b700 1324 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa9e8c440 1008 \xca\xfe\xba\xbe ...
0xa9e8cf50 157 Manifest-Version: 1.
0xa9e8d2e8 157 Manifest-Version: 1.
0xa9e8d680 157 Manifest-Version: 1.
0xa9e8da58 157 Manifest-Version: 1.
Table 4.6 : Compressed class
(gray), password (red), and
other files found in the Java
heap.
- offset - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 0123456789ABCDEF
0x00000000 cafe babe 0000 0032 000d 0700 0b07 000c .......2........
0x00000010 0100 0a61 6464 4172 6368 6976 6f01 0011 ...addArchivo...
0x00000020 284c 6a61 7661 2f69 6f2f 4669 6c65 3b29 (Ljava/io/File;)
0x00000030 5601 000d 6361 7267 6172 506c 7567 696e V...cargarPlugin
0x00000040 7301 0003 2829 5a01 000a 6765 7450 6c75 s...()Z...getPlu
0x00000050 6769 6e73 0100 1928 295b 4c70 6c75 6769 gins...()[Lplugi
0x00000060 6e73 2f41 6477 696e 6453 6572 7665 723b ns/AdwindServer;
0x00000070 0100 0a53 6f75 7263 6546 696c 6501 0015 ...SourceFile...
0x00000080 496e 7465 7266 6163 6550 6c75 6769 6e73 InterfacePlugins
0x00000090 2e6a 6176 6101 0018 706c 7567 696e 732f .java...plugins/
0x000000a0 496e 7465 7266 6163 6550 6c75 6769 6e73 InterfacePlugins
0x00000000 cafe babe 0000 0032 000a 0700 0807 0009 .......2........
0x00000010 0100 0e67 6574 496e 666f 726d 6163 696f ...getInformacio
0x00000020 6e01 0014 2829 4c6a 6176 612f 6c61 6e67 n...()Ljava/lang
0x00000030 2f53 7472 696e 673b 0100 0d67 6574 4d61 /String;...getMa
0x00000040 6341 6464 7265 7373 0100 0a53 6f75 7263 cAddress...Sourc
0x00000050 6546 696c 6501 0012 696e 7465 7266 6163 eFile...interfac
0x00000060 6549 6e66 6f2e 6a61 7661 0100 166f 7063 eInfo.java...opc
0x00000070 696f 6e65 732f 696e 7465 7266 6163 6549 iones/interfaceI
0x00000080 6e66 6f01 0010 6a61 7661 2f6c 616e 672f nfo...java/lang/
Table 4.7 : Extracted class data for Adwind’s plugin interface
and survey functionality.
we found that some of the structural information of the messages was lost, because the proxy
used DataInputStream to read the message length and command directly off the wire. While the
message may not be intact, a forensic analyst could examine the class and method metadata and
try to assemble a data flow graph, which could help recreate the message structure.
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/ / r2 −c ’ j a v a p r o t o t y p e s a ’ \
/ / a e 0 5 b d f f 4 d 1 3 2 4 a 9 e 8 b 7 0 0 . c l a s s
import j a v a . l a n g . C l a s s L o a d e r ;
import j a v a . l a n g . S t r i n g ;
import j a v a . u t i l . z i p . GZIPInputS t ream ;
import e x t r a .CLM;
import e x t r a .CLM;
import e x t r a . C o n s t a n t e ;
c l a s s e x t r a /CLM { / / @0x0000
/ / F i e l d s d e f i n e d i n t h e c l a s s
p u b l i c s t a t i c S t r i n g p a s s ;
p r i v a t e s t a t i c f i n a l e x t r a .CLM i n s t a n c i a ;
/ / Methods d e f i n e d i n t h e c l a s s
p r i v a t e vo id < i n i t > ( ) ;
p u b l i c s t a t i c e x t r a .CLM g e t I n s t a n c e ( ) ;
p u b l i c j a v a . l a n g . C l a s s f i n d C l a s s ( S t r i n g ) ;
p r i v a t e byte [ ] l o a d C l a s s D a t a ( S t r i n g ) ;
p u b l i c s t a t i c byte [ ] descomprime ( byte [ ] ) ;
s t a t i c vo id < c l i n i t > ( ) ;
}
Listing 4.1: Radare2 java prototypes command reveals a custom loader in the de-
compressed class data.
4.4.3 Scripted Intrusion
We created a script that models how a smash-and-grab attacker would behave in a post-compromise
setting. The scenario centers around an attacker exploiting the fact that dynamic plugins can be up-
loaded to a dotCMS server†. In this case the attacker leverages administrator credentials to upload
and activate the plugin. When the plugin activates, it uses wget to retrieve and start the attacker’s
backdoor. The attacker uses a script to execute a series of steps using the malware. After each step
in this script, we take a memory snapshot of the virtual machine and perform the JVM analysis.
The implant relies on ProcessBuilder to execute system commands outside of the Java environ-
ment and has functions that allow the attacker to proxy and communicate with other systems, read
†http://dotcms.com/
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Obj. Address Remote Connection In/Out Data (Up to 30 Bytes)
0x91c779b8 10.18.120.18 48002 ⇒ Do something evil-48002!
0x91c7ead0 10.18.120.18 48003 ⇒ Do something evil-48003!
0x91c85b70 10.18.120.18 48002 ⇐ s3cr3t d4t3 48002-00000000s3cr
0x91c938d8 172.16.124.15 58860 ⇒ czNjcjN0X2Q0dDNfNDgwMDItMDAw
0x91c980d0 10.18.120.18 48003 ⇐ s3cr3t d4t3 48003-00000000s3cr
0x91ca5cb8 172.16.124.15 58860 ⇒ czNjcjN0X2Q0dDNfNDgwMDMtMDAw
0x91cbfef0 10.18.120.18 48004 ⇒ Do something evil-48004!
0x91cc7008 10.18.120.18 48005 ⇒ Do something evil-48005!
0x91ccdee8 10.18.120.18 48004 ⇐ s3cr3t d4t3 48004-00000000s3cr
0x91cdbad0 172.16.124.15 58860 ⇒ czNjcjN0X2Q0dDNfNDgwMDQtMDAw
0x91ce02c8 10.18.120.18 48005 ⇐ s3cr3t d4t3 48005-00000000s3cr
0x91cedeb0 172.16.124.15 58860 ⇒ czNjcjN0X2Q0dDNfNDgwMDUtMDAw
Table 4.8 : Recovered socket data (colored by the proxied connection) shows how the heap address
forms a communication timeline.
and write files, download files, and interact with the OS.
This evaluation concentrates on the created processes, and how much information can gleaned from
their Java artifacts. This script starts 73 processes that execute OS commands (e.g. ls, ps, etc.)
Figure 4.2 shows how much command history is retained in the heap over time. Three garbage
collection cycles are observable at t = 25, t = 27, and t = 30. Malware data exfiltration triggers
the GC events.
The process objects accumulate and remain in memory even after several garbage collections.
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Figure 4.2 : Number of recoverable
process artifacts present in the heap
throughout the scripted attack.
Event Log from Extracted Process Builder and Process Information
Address Process Builder Command PID Buffered Data
0x91cb7258 sudo cat /etc/sudoers 1242 #\n# This file MUST be edited w
0x91e1c6f8 uname -ar 1245 Linux java-workx32-00 3.19.0-1
0x91e2bd98 id -un 1247 java\n
0x91e3aff0 id -nG 1248 java adm cdrom sudo dip plugde
0x91e4a598 sudo cat /etc/passwd 1250 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bas
0x91eb1240 sudo cat /etc/shadow 1252 root:!:16678:0:99999:7:::\ndaem
0x91ec2da0 sudo netstat -ap
0x91eefea8 ls -all 1273 total 10312\ndrwxrwxr-x 6 java
0x91f556f0 ls -all
0x91f66498 sudo -S nmap [...] 1275 \nStarting Nmap 6.47 ( http://n
0x91f7e400 sudo lsof
0x91f8d810 mount -v 1298 sysfs on /sys type sysfs (rw,n
0x91ff7ce0 cat /root/.bash history 1301 history — grep pg\n history — gr
0x92014d20 cat /home/java/.bash history 1307 ifconfig\nsudo add-apt-reposito
0x9203ae78 ps -ef
0x920623c0 zip -r /tmp/backup.dat.zip 1322 adding: home/java/.ssh/ (sto
0x920720a0 ps -ef
0x92099530 ls -all /tmp/ 1328 total 44\ndrwxrwxrwt 9 root ro
0x920aab68 cat /tmp/backup.dat.zip 1333 PK\x03\x04\n\xdbL\x1fG\x0f\x1c
0x920cb718 ls -all /tmp/backup.dat.zip 1338 -rw-r–r– 1 root root 1617 Au
0x920db348 dd if=/dev/urandom of=
0x920ead40 zip -r
0x921601c8 ps -ef
0x922c5dd8 ps -ef
0x922ed348 zip -r /tmp/logs.zip /var/log/ 1354 adding: var/log/ (stored 0%)
0x92305c50 ps -ef
Table 4.9 : At t = 21, process artifacts are used to
create an event log.
These processes also retain buffered data, which can be used to infer the commands executed on
the system. Table 4.10 shows a sample of these buffered processes at the end of the experiment. We
can see that an analyst could infer what 11 out of the 16 listed processes were doing. To verify this
information, we refer back to t = 24 before the garbage collection wiped out most of the command
history. Table 4.9 shows how the ProcessBuilder objects and the Process data buffers can be
used to assemble an event log.
We also evaluate recovery of process artifacts from Volatility. For each memory image, the
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Address PID Buffered Output
0x67020b20 1275 \nStarting Nmap 6.47 ( http://n
0x67020c10 1403 total 176584\ndrwxrwxrwt 9 roo
0x6702de70 1273 total 10312\ndrwxrwxr-x 6 java
0x6702eb78 1252 root:!:16678:0:99999:7:::\ndaem
0x67092350 1250 root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bas
0x67092b88 1248 java adm cdrom sudo dip plugde
0x670c0720 1245 Linux java-workx32-00 3.19.0-1
0x670c0880 1242 #\n# This file MUST be edited w
0x670c0f18 1354 adding: var/log/ (stored 0%)
0x670c13d8 1338 -rw-r–r– 1 root root 1617 Au
0x670c15d0 1333 PK\x03\x04\n\xdbL\x1fG\x0f\x1c
0x6711d068 1328 total 44\ndrwxrwxrwt 9 root ro
0x6711d718 1322 adding: home/java/.ssh/ (sto
0x6714c8b0 1307 ifconfig\nsudo add-apt-reposito
0x6714cc10 1301 history | grep pg\nhistory | gr
0x6714ceb8 1298 sysfs on /sys type sysfs (rw,n
Table 4.10 : Interesting process output
recovered at t=35.
Address Calls Method Name
0x63fdb6f8 256 Loader getLoaderInstance(...)
0x63fdb908 73 byte[] b64Decode(...)
0x63fdce98 256 integer sendSocketData(...)
0x63fdd038 256 integer sendSocketData(...)
0x63fdd670 1 void addClientHandlerSocket(...)
0x63fdd718 256 void stdout(...)
0x63fdd850 256 void logEvent(...)
0x63fddbd8 73 integer getPid(...)
0x63fddd50 73 integer startProcess(...)
0x63fddf68 256 java.lang.String readProcessStdout(...)
0x63fdd9e8 1 void main(...)
0x63fde1d8 1 integer access$100(...)
0x63fde168 2 java.lang.String access$000(...)
0x63fdb670 1 void start(...);
Table 4.11 : Call metadata for a selection of the
Loader’s methods at t=35, revealing a large num-
ber of IO operations.
linux psview and linux psxview are used to try and find artifacts. Only one process (sudo
lsof) could be accurately identified. This process runs from t = 10 through the end of the exper-
iment. No other process artifacts could be recovered. We believe they were unrecoverable due to
OS activity and memory volatility, because the relevant data structures were overwritten at some
point after process termination and memory deallocation. This shows the limits Volatility and other
similar frameworks, which do not currently account for runtime artifacts.
The HotSpot JVM produces telemetric data to help improve performance. MethodCounters are
initialized on a method’s first call, and it tracks the number of calls, which can be useful for
malware analysis (Table 4.11). For example, if malware uses a HashMap to map specific commands
to specific functions, understanding the malware’s behavior is very challenging. The telemetric
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information helps discern relevant functions from noise or potential obfuscation.
4.5 Future work
Future work should address several key challenges. First, our analysis tools can use a significant
amount of memory while processing a malware memory image. Overhead results from creating
environmental objects and values in addition to annotations which help support our analyses. The
resulting memory consumption becomes an issue when memory image sizes are multiple gigabytes
or when there are 100,000 or more individual objects.
Furthermore there is a semantic gap between some objects that prevents directly finding links
between these objects without deeper analysis. At runtime, relevant information about an object
can be determined with an API call. When the memory is analyzed in a static manner, those API
calls are not available (even though the information that they use is typically in memory). This
was the case with JAR file entry names and the compressed data from the entry in our experiment.
A symbolic execution for VM bytecode (e.g. CLR, HotSpot, etc.) would help to eliminate this
problem.
4.6 Conclusions
RecOOP is a memory analysis framework that helps generalize digital forensics of managed run-
times. We developed an implementation focused on the HotSpot JVM for Java 8. We also showed
that the framework is practical for digital forensics and malware analysis, complementing other
such tools.
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Chapter 5
Future Work
Our work establishes a memory analysis tool chain for the HotSpot JVM, and it lays the ground-
work for memory analysis in managed runtimes. This tool chain provides forensic and malware
analysts with reverse engineering tools that work on multiple OS platforms. We also proposed
a modular framework targeting the analysis of mobile malware and improving collaboration and
analysis work flow. Our work improves the forensics fields, but there are several areas that require
additional research.
5.1 Large Image Memory Analysis
System memory size is quickly exceeding the capacity of current tools. For example, the memory
in a compromised server might exceed hundreds of GiB. Analyzing large memory images poses
a number of different challenges. First, the memory size increases the search space for relevant
artifacts and evidence. The increase in size also increases the intermediate data product along with
the compute power required perform the final analysis. This increase in size demands more storage
space for the initial memory image and the data byproducts.
Memory overlay systems take a binary blob and interpret it as a structure or value. The inter-
pretation is based on a defined syntax that permits a robust definition of full or incomplete data
structures. These representations can be challenging to implement because program memory lay-
outs vary with OS, hardware architecture, and even the compiler used to create the program.
The primary challenge stems from the fact that overlays create several similar object types. When
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overlays are applied to the binary data, excessive memory consumption results from several general
cases. First, there is a binary copy and an interpreted copy of the value. Second, if the overlay
interprets a com- plex value (e.g. an OOP data structure), then every interpreted OOP includes the
type definition, values, and potentially a copy of the binary data. Finally, when binary data is lifted
to runtime objects (e.g. binary blobs to Python instances) there is a penalty because the values
in the overlay get expanded to the runtimes implementations of the overlay values. For programs
with a small number of extracted artifacts, the penalty is negligible. However, as the number of
artifacts rise above 5,000, the runtime performance deteriorates and the consumption of memory
balloons.
A solution to this problem might be to implement a heap memory management system similar to
the HotSpot JVM. The overlay system keeps a dictionary of known types, and each overlay object
uses a structure that resembles an OOP. The overlay OOPs require at most four 8-byte words.
The first word is the header or bit field specifying ownership and other relevant information. The
second word points to the memory overlay information and code for any transformations. The
third word points to the bytes interpreted by the overlay. The final word is an object or structure
containing analysis annotations or other related information.
This approach alleviates the memory consumption because of redundant values and duplicate data
structures. For the most part, the interpretation of values and structures is lazy, so the only time
binary blobs are accessed is when they are needed. The general concept seems straight forward,
but additional research and engineering are required to determine how to manage types and values
when analyzing large memory images or images with many overlay objects.
Signatures or indicators of compromise (IOC) are used to identify malfeasance or threat actors
operating in a network or on a host. Signatures come in many different forms. Initially, signatures
started out as byte strings or regular expressions that were applied to network streams, memory
images, and files. Anti-virus software relied heavily on these types of signatures.
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Figure 5.1 : This diagram shows some of the complexity involved in identifying and extracting
signature matches in encrypted data.
Another type of IOC relies on program behaviors or machine state. Behavioral signatures use
network, system, and process events to find anomalous behavior. Generally, systems that use
behavioral signatures operate in an online manner, meaning the systems, network, etc. are running.
However, these signatures can be applied on a system memory image along with events captured
from the network. Other IOCs include file hashes, email content or addresses, observed URLs,
malware, etc.
With all these different features, digital forensics and incident response have evolved into a data
mining problem. Many different tools and technologies identify these indicators and report the
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incident, and analysts respond in kind to mitigate the problem. However, memory forensics still
lags because many of the tools and frameworks cannot incorporate this external state. Furthermore,
memory analysis still relies mostly on signatures.
Unfortunately rule-based (e.g. chained signatures) tools are still very limited. For example, a
Yara rule file can search for multiple strings and create conditional rules based on the presence of
the string in memory. However, if the indicator is encoded, obfuscated, or encrypted in memory,
identification or detection of these indicators fails. A stateful system with built-in decoders, dis-
assemblers, and an understanding of well known data structures will help imrpove these systems.
While the exact design is subject to future research, this analysis environment requires a grammar
that helps define when to apply a rule, when to apply transformations, and how to handle the results
of these analyses.
Future work in this area also needs to consider external events captured from monitoring services
or servers. A framework integrating relevant network events into the memory analysis routine
will help with rebuilding system level events. For example, captured historical events like registry
writes or network communication can be combined with internal host connections to reveal lateral
movement.
When these activities are detected, there is no defined approach or methodology for comparing
system memory, let alone memory snapshots taken on the same system. Diffing memory will help
reduce much of the analysis by comparing known good with bad, or by comparing memory at two
different time periods, which can reveal important details.
Techniques for diffing memory images are necessary to improve automated memory analysis, but
it has yet to be defined. Memory diffing can be used to compare a known good memory image to a
known bad image. The process seems simple, but future research must devise a way to overcome
the process virtual addressing, pages missing due to system activity, and finding ways to handle
large memory images.
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(a) Layout of the process in the system (b) Comparing a process from two snapshots
Figure 5.2 : Diffing a process from the same host at two different times.
The research needs to determine the appropriate level of diffing. For example, performing a byte-
for-byte comparison might yield poor results due to excessive noise. However, trying to diff mem-
ory at a data structure requires some internal knowledge about the programs components. Au-
tomatically learning these internals might be possible if enough samples are provided, because
values that look like memory addresses can be used to build up potential structures. Finding the
right balance is necessary since an analysts time can be constrained. Other attributes might also
be considered for diffing memory. The amount used or current size of the process memory maps
might prove useful to compare.
Comparing process memory between two different architectures is another interesting challenge.
However, these architectures generally have architectural nuances preventing a direct comparison.
Some of these nuances include word sizes, addressable memory boundaries (e.g. 4-byte boundary
in RISC vs. 1-byte boundary for Intel x86), little endian versus big endian, etc. One approach
might be to create an intermediate representation for values in memory and then attempt to diff
that representation. This intermediate representation can also eliminate all the unnecessary data to
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help make the comparison more effective.
Distributed memory analysis will become a necessity to handle very large memory images. To
put this issue into context, host memory typically ranges between 4-16 GiB, but server memory
can range between 32 GiB to multiple TiB. Memory forensics research presumes that a memory
image will fit on a hard disk. However, as the size of memory increases, especially for servers, this
presumption will be broken. Furthermore, large memory images require traversing the entire image
to excavate relevant information. This analysis includes identifying malicious code, extracting
console history, looking for injected libraries, etc. When the memory image is small, this approach
is not a hindrance to the overall process of memory analysis.
Memory forensics will need to become more service oriented, handling different parts of mem-
ory separately. For example, when the memory is submitted for analysis the first step will be to
enumerate the processes and kernel memory. Next, the memory will be carved up and submitted
for detailed analysis. The analysis will extract artifacts like libraries, application code, services,
etc. Objects, code, processes, and other artifacts are then classified to help expedite analysis and
respond to the incident at hand.
5.2 Extend RecOOP to other architectures
We demonstrate that managed runtimes contain a plethora of information. When an attacker uses
these runtimes for malicious activity, the managed memory can act as a history buffer. For example
the HotSpot JVM retained the remnants from stdout from a number of terminated processes. This
research can be extended to other runtimes like Microsoft .Net, Google V8 JavaScript Engine, and
the 64-bit version of the HotSpot JVM.
Source code recovery from binary code structures is another important extension to our work. In
some runtimes, program code is compiled before execution begins (e.g. AOT) or when code is
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executed frequently (e.g. JIT). This compilation results in optimized native code, which helps the
VM perform faster. When program bytecode is loaded, sometimes this code or a variant of it is
retained as a safety mechanism.
Most code recovery efforts focus on lifting the native code into an intermediate language (IL), and
then decompiling IL into a C or C++ like representation. However, this code could be reverted
back into its deoptimized form (e.g. bytecode) and then decompiled. Each of these runtimes retain
structures to revert to the original code because the optimized code could be an incorrect version
of the original function.
One reason for addressing this challenge is due to attackers creating functionality in memory with-
out a tangible program. Specifically, Microsoft Powershell gives attackers and administrators the
power to submit C# code for a task. The C# code is compiled by a VM and then added to the envi-
ronment. The underlying data structures that represent the code in the VM can be used to recover
the source submitted by the attacker.
Multi-architecture emulation or symbolic execution should also be addressed. There are sev-
eral frameworks that support symbolic execution and emulation for forensic purposes. In general,
these frameworks typically only support one architecture at a time. However, managed runtimes
generally support executing native code alongside the managed code.
This presents a challenge in several respects. First, frameworks exclude managed runtime bytecode
execution support. They tend to focus only on native architectures like ARM, x86, x86-64, and
MIPS. Second, when frameworks begin to support these dual environments, they must be aware
of the VM, VM contexts (e.g. native or managed), understand how values are marshaled between
environment, etc. Finally, the resulting framework should be able to discern between native code,
AOT or JIT native code, and VM bytecodes.
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Figure 5.3 : Using similar memory allocation methods from generational GC runtimes could im-
prove malware analysis. As time passes, new and old memory allocations for segments of memory
can be compared to identify program behavior.
5.3 Improving Malware Analysis with Managed Memory
Virtualization enables the construction of economical malware sandboxes. These sandboxes are
virtual machines (e.g. virtual hardware and OS) with well-known applications that attackers at-
tempt to exploit. These sandboxes typically monitor memory reads and writes, look for injected
libraries or machine code, capture traffic, watch for several other system modifications.
Design and development of a sandbox is challenging for several reasons. First, low-level instru-
mentation is required to capture call sites, read call parameters, etc. Second, each patch could
bring a wave of new changes to the modified OS, so the sandbox environment may be hard to
maintain. Third, creating and maintaining a realistic environment for the malware to run in re-
quires a great deal of effort. Finally, performing analysis on the resulting memory reads and writes
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produces a significant amount of data. All this data must be thoroughly analyzed to extract mean-
ingful information. For common malware, this process is easy, but state-sponsored malware or
very sophisticated attackers can evade sandboxes easily.
One way around the cost of maintaining an instrumented sandbox is to focus purely on black box
analysis. For example, instead of instrumenting the VM, just let it run without any intervention,
and simply record the state at the end of the execution. Unfortunately, this approach can miss vital
information.
An alternative is to use a managed memory system. In this case the managed memory is a large
pool of memory that works like a Java heap. When a program makes an allocation, the OS or
hypervisor fulfills the allocation request and passes a pointer back to the process. This approach
is attractive because memory allocations can be monitored, and as time marches forward, there is
an understanding about when reads and writes take place. This approach could also make memory
diffing much easier.
In theory this sounds simple, but there are a few challenges ahead. First, allocating memory in this
manner might lead to out of memory segmentation faults, so the process or hypervisor might need
to perform GC. In this case, the GC is simply compaction, where live memory is simply moved
closer to the start of the heap. At each GC, the memory regions can be labeled and dumped for
analysis and diffing over time. However, this GC process leads to a second challenge.
When the memory addresses are moved, all the raw pointers in the heap are invalidated. This
means the raw-pointer access needs to be regulated with an address translation mechanism. Also,
if this sandboxing technique is implemented in the OS; the OS will be limited to controlling a set
of processes memory allocation. If the malware injects into another process the OS may not be
able to maintain the memory tracking or address translation mechanism.
This means the most effective place to implement and control this type of allocation is in the
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hypervisor. In this case, the hypervisor could attempt to use linear addressing and allocation for all
programs and processes. Otherwise, the hypervisor could simply be informed of a process to track
and work with the OS on providing memory to the process on each allocation. If malware injects
into the process, the hypervisor can be used to mark the victim process, and then that processs
memory allocation can be switched to the managed memory model.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The HotSpot JVM is one of the most prominent managed runtimes in enterprise networks. Attack-
ers recognize that they can write malware that runs on multiple types of hardware architectures
and operating systems. Writing malware in these managed runtimes also helps them evade most
endpoint security technologies that are not able to perform program inspection.
Furthermore, attackers and threat actors only need to succeed once to be successful. Many orga-
nizations are not prepared to deal with the aftermath of a successful attack. The response requires
understanding the most current state of the network, which requires a mix of network traffic analy-
sis, logs from a myriad of sources, and most importantly memory dumps from the affected systems.
Understanding and extracting relevant evidence from memory dumps is very challenging, and
the difficulty only increases when there are no plugins or tools to support specific processes or
programs. Due to the prevalence and other managed runtimes, we have focused our efforts on
understanding and recovering information from HotSpot processes. First, we showed that man-
aged runtimes have the potential to retain artifacts for a significant period. Then we developed a
methodology for tackling the memory analysis of managed runtimes.
We exploit the fact that the internal memory management system performs very little, if any data
sanitization. Managed runtimes also use internal data structure information that contains all the
loaded type information. We show that these structures can be mined in a consistent manner to
recover any objects that were present in the heap. This information can be used to rebuild the data
type and member fields without any access to the source code. Furthermore, the recovered byte
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code can be decompiled into the original language, and this can be used for analysis.
Even though system memory recycles overtime, we found that some of the history, which may be
absent from the operating system data structures, may still be recoverable. For example, processes
started from Java remained in the heap for extended periods of time. These commands were only
overwritten when the simulated attacker exfiltrated large amounts of data.
Memory analysis is slowly moving off the OS stack. This stack builds on hardware abstraction
layers and the operating system, but now forensic analysts need to be able to analyze prevalent
applications, especially when these applications are companys production and revenue streams. In
a modern information technology infrastructure, the cost of tearing down and rebuilding a virtual
machine is cheap. Capturing the memory is also inexpensive, but analyzing this memory to deter-
mine how a Java server was compromised is expensive. We have developed a methodology and
tool set that helps reduce this cost.
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